1.
Slippery slopes crop up with startling frequency when controversial moral issues are debated. Generally, those who mount this line of argument appeal to some grim, highly undesirable state of affairs which would-they allege-inevitably ensue were society to sanction certain activities. Their reasoning is often fallacious, offering little more than an easy out for those reluctant to address problematic moral issues with the care and honesty they demand.
However, as Trudy Govier has recently demonstrated, 3 a slippery slope can be formulated so that its conceptual, psychological, and causal claims are clearly distinguished and fallacious reasoning avoided. This type of slope argument has the following general structure:
1. Case (a) is prima facie acceptable. 2. Cases (b), (c) ... (n) are unacceptable. 3. Cases (a)... (n) are assimilable, as they differ from each other only by degrees, and are arrangeable as a spectrum of cases. 4. As a matter of psychological fact, people are likely to assimilate cases (a)-(n). 5. Case (a), if permitted, will be taken as a precedent for the others, (b)-(n). 6. Permitting (a) will cause the permission of (b)-(n). 7. Case (a) should therefore not be permitted. 4 One might, then, non-fallaciously argue that since, as a matter of psychological fact, people tend to group cases together, acceptance of an initial case (e.g., voluntary euthanasia in the case of the terminally ill) will lead to acceptance of a series of further undesirable cases (nonvoluntary euthanasia of defective newborns, the senile, the insane). The soundness of such reasoning turns crucially upon the establishment of premise four. The empirical support advanced for this premise will largely determine the force of the consequentialist considerations which the arguer would have us assess. Thus, a slippery-slope argument can be a good argument. When it is, Govier observes,' 'it is a legitimate consequentialist argument against a course of action. If all of its premises are warranted, the argument presents an important reason not to undertake a course of action which would have otherwise seemed quite acceptable". 5 Gregory Trianosky has contended 6 that such slippery-slope considerations need to be recognized as important factors which can weigh against the choice of a moral code. They contain the valuable psychological insight that certain combinations of rules might generate internal stresses in moral agents and that these stresses might seriously affect the probabilities of agents acting in accordance with the code. Yet, he maintains, a number of our normative ethical theories are forced to disregard slippery-slope claims. His argument takes ideal ruleutilitarianism as illustrative and might be reconstructed as follows: (P t ) IRU is one of a family of theories which can be called codeacceptance theories of rightness, and as such what it seeks to evaluate are the consequences of a moral code's acceptance in a society. (P 2 ) The notion of acceptance 7 we find in IRU is a success notion, i.e., built into it is the assumption that moral agents succeed in dis-4 Ibid., 315. The slope arguments with which this paper are concerned are of this non-fallacious variety. 5 Ibid., 316. 6 G. Trianosky, "Rule Utilitarianism and the Slippery Slope", Journal of Philosophy 75/8 (August 1978). 7 The partial analysis of acceptance which Trianosky finds most plausible, and upon which he relies, is culled from Brandt and Hare. According to it, agents are said to accept a moral code only if they are sufficiently motivated to try to apply and act in accordance with the code, experience discomfort or guilt if they violate it, and are disturbed when in the presence o!' anyone who violates it. Cf. ibid.. 416.
playing certain fairly high levels of motivation (or performance) with respect to each provision of a given moral code.
Therefore, (C) IRU is unable to recognize and evaluate internal psychological conflicts within the code, or between the code and other of the agent's (non-moral) motivations and attitudes which may in fact preclude success.
The conclusion which Trianosky reaches is this:
if we are to take seriously those sorts of argument from psychological conflict of which certain slippery-slope claims are the most well-known instances ... we must replace the notion of acceptance ... with something else that isn't a success notion. We might for instance want to evaluate the consequences of a code's being supported or promulgated by the moral agents in our society ... .
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The demand that our normative ethical theories be able to cope with the type of carefully formulated slope argument Govier describes seems well founded. I am not convinced, however, that it is necessary to abandon the notion of code-acceptance which appears in standard formulations of IRU in order to sensitize the latter to slippery-slope considerations.
2.
According to IRU an act is right if and only if it is permitted or recognized by that (learnable or educationally possible) moral code whose acceptance in the agent's society would maximize utility. (Call this principle P.) The force of the slippery-slope argument with respect to P is that in some cases this principle is self-defeating or self-frustrating (and thus, that it is an unacceptable moral principle). The aim of P is to maximize utility and it seeks to do this by evaluating the consequences of a moral code's acceptance in the agent's society. This aim will be defeated in those cases of proposed moral codes containing rules or provisions which, given certain psychological facts about actual moral agents, would likely generate internal conflicts or motivational stresses in those agents severe enough as to affect the probabilities of their acting in accordance with other provisions or rules of the code. We might refer to such codes as practically or psychologically impossible moral codes. 9 The argument is that there are practical obstacles to the application of IRU-namely, certain psychological facts about actual moral agents. If actual moral agents attempt to apply P utility will not be maximized. The structure of the argument can best be seen in an example.
10 Consider a simple moral code C. C deals only with killing and is composed of three parts: K, the set of rules permitting voluntary euthanasia; L, the set of rules on killing for which (it is claimed) motivations and attitudes are endangered; and M, the set of remaining, undamaged rules on killing. Someone advancing a slippery-slope argument might maintain that, given certain psychological facts about actual moral agents:
S (I) If such agents accept a code C containing a voluntary euthanasia provision K, then the motivations and attitudes which support another provision L of the same code C will be so weakened or destroyed that they would no longer exert a decisive influence on action. (II) If the motivations and attitudes supporting L are so weakened or destroyed that they would no longer exert a decisive influence on action, then utility would not be maximized.
(Ill) Therefore, if actual moral agents accept C, utility will not be maximized.
This argument can have no impact on the rule-utilitarian view expressed in P. According to Trianosky the reason for this is that IRU, as a code-acceptance theory, assumes that moral agents will succeed in displaying certain fairly high levels of motivation with respect to each provision of a given moral code. Since acceptance is, in this sense, a success notion, he proposes that we abandon it and replace it by something else (such as code promulgation). My response, briefly, will be as follows. By supposing that S captures the full force of the slope argument, Trianosky overlooks what is problematic about the notion of acceptance embodied in P. This is not that it is a success notion, but that it is an "otherworldly" notioninsensitive to psychological facts about actual moral agents. (Criticism of IRU's insensitivity to slope considerations, then, parallels other criticism commonly directed against IRU.) In both 5 and P it is simply assumed that the proposed code is accepted (i.e., that the antecedent of III, and of the implied conditional in P, is satisfied). One then proceeds to inquire about the hypothetical situation in which this occurs. What is needed to sensitize IRU to slope considerations is, I will argue, some stipulation as to the satisfaction of this antecedent.
11 What is needed, in short, is a notion of acceptance designed for actual moral agents.
To see this, we need first to explore more closely the nature and significance of slippery-slope claims. Most slippery-slope arguments are directed against the acceptance of a proposed code, or (what amounts to the same) against a change in the actual moral code. An opponent of voluntary euthanasia might argue that-given certain empirical facts about the motivations, behavioural inhibitions, attitudes, and beliefs of actual moral agents-a proposed code which relaxed the prohibitions on killing to allow voluntary euthanasia would also weaken or destroy the supporting motives and attitudes for related prohibitions. These motivations, attitudes, etc. form a "vast web" which undergirds the presently accepted moral code-a code which has not yet clearly sanctioned voluntary euthanasia. What worries the person advancing the argument is that if we qualify the prohibition against killing in order to allow voluntary euthanasia we may well thereby open the door to other qualifications: "... the reinforcement of permissive attitudes in one area will thus 'spill over' from its target and alter other related motivations and attitudes as well".
12 If the first step is taken, we will find ourselves off on a journey down the slope.
The slope argument is, thus, essentially directed towards problems that might arise in the transition from accepting one moral code (in this case our present code which does not clearly sanction voluntary euthanasia) to accepting a different code which expressly qualifies the obligations on killing so as to permit voluntary euthanasia. Surprisingly, Trianosky claims he is not interested in such transitional problems: "the slope arguments with which I am concerned focus rather on internal strains generated by the conflict of provisions within the code itself, or after the code begins to operate". 13 It is not at all clear, however, that there are two distinct types of slope argument, much less that one can make sense of a slope argument which addresses "internal" rather than "transitional" problems. After all, what the arguer is claiming is that internal strains will be generated within a proposed moral code which qualifies the prohibition against killing because of certain psychological facts about actual moral agents living under the present code which is not so qualified. The argument is that human nature being what it is (attitudes, motivations, etc. being what they are), the proposed transition to a qualified code C is unacceptable since it would result in a progressive deterioration of our inhibitions against killing in general.
By focusing on "internal" problems that would arise after a code permitting voluntary euthanasia had begun to operate, Trianosky fails to develop the full force of the slope argument-namely, that the qualified code C is unacceptable for actual moral agents.
14 Slippery-slope claims can be given a stronger formulation than they receive in S. The adamant opponent of voluntary euthanasia might reasonably argue that not only must C be rejected on utilitarian grounds, it must be rejected on any 12 Trianosky, "Rule-Utilitarianism", 415. 13 Ibid., 415, footnote 2. 14 At one point he comes close to appreciating that slope arguments address transitional concerns: "I cannot see that we would necessarily have good reasons to act on-or even to press for the acceptance of-the recommendations of a code which, though it would maximize utility if accepted in toto, cannot be so accepted because of important psychological facts about the relations among various motives, attitudes, and beliefs of moral agents" (ibid., 420). He never develops this insight, however.
grounds because it is practically or psychologically impossible for actual moral agents to accept (and a fortiori, to follow) C. The full force of slope claims (with respect to any code-acceptance theory, not simply IRU) can be appreciated in the following argument:
S' (i) In order for actual moral agents to be able to accept a code C, they must be able to accept each of the provisions K, L, and M ofC. (ii) Actual moral agents will be able to accept each of the provisions K, L, and M of C only if they are sufficiently motivated to do so. (Hi) Given the psychological facts about actual moral agents and given their acceptance of provision K, they will no longer be sufficiently motivated to accept provision L.
Therefore, (iv) actual moral agents cannot accept C.
There is indeed a fundamental problem with the notion of acceptance found in P. It is an "otherworldly" notion; it does not permit us to discriminate between those codes which would be psychologically possible, and those which would be psychologically impossible, for actual moral agents to accept. IRU is insensitive to the type of slippery-slope considerations expressed in 5' because it is insensitive to actual world considerations. The ideal rule-utilitarian assumption that moral agents succeed in displaying certain fairly high levels of motivation with respect to each provision of a given moral code is problematic (if we want slope claims to be relevant in our choice of a given moral code) because in the case of some codes-those psychologically impossible for actual moral agents-such a successful display can be had only by ideal, not actual, moral agents. Accordingly, the full force of the slope argument with respect to P is that when we, actual moral agents, turn to a principle like P to obtain moral guidance we may well find ourselves advised to act in accordance with a code acceptable only by a society of ideal moral agents. If we take the advice we will find ourselves acting in a self-defeating manner. Our efforts to maximize utility will be frustrated by the progressive deterioration of motivations generated by internal psychological conflicts within the code. 15 Criticism of P's otherworldly and self-defeating nature is by now standard. (Proponents of rule-utilitarianism have themselves raised it... notably Brandt who, admitting that IRU "savors a bit of the Utopian", has attempted to fashion an alternative to P which will solve the problem of determining a set of rules "for an imperfect society". Cf. R. Brandt, "Toward a 
3.
For a slope argument to have an impact on P a notion of acceptance designed for actual moral agents is required. It may still be a success notion, but this would no longer be problematic. The successful display of motivation would be with respect to each provision of only those codes which are psychologically possible. Slope considerations would be relevant to our choice of a moral code. The simplest way to do this is to emend P by specifying that the code be such that its acceptance is psychologically possible. If a slope argument is sound, and a code like C is not psychologically possible, then C is ipso facto unacceptable. John Rawls has, in a different context, discussed the need for a psychological-possibility requirement.
However attractive a conception of justice might be on other grounds, it is seriously defective if the principles of moral psychology are such that it fails to engender in human beings the requisite desire to act upon it ... if it is a psychological law that individuals pursue only interests in themselves, it is impossible for them to have an effective sense of justice (as defined by the principle of utility).
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Trianosky considers emending P by including such a requirement but quickly rules it out, 17 finding the consequences unacceptable. I find his argument wanting in several respects.
His central reason for rejecting such an emendation is this. Although we do want slope claims to be relevant to our choice of a moral code, we do not want them to be necessarily decisive. They will be decisive under quality of IRU to its lack of, or indeterminancy with respect to, minimizing conditions. IRU will be self-defeating when it is not generally accepted-which is the normal state of affairs. 17 Trianosky also rejects the learnability requirement, suggesting that we might want to pick a code that was not learnable in its entirety by everyone. This suggestion rests on the plausibility of the idea that morality involves a sort of "excellent activity". Like certain games, some of its rules may be so complex that most ordinary "players" would be unable to learn them. Thus it may not be an activity in which all can perfect themselves. This "argument" strikes me as wholly unsuccessful. It is far from clear that the more complex tournament rules of golf, or even chess, are such that they are quite beyond the intellectual grasp of most ordinary players. These players may find the games harder to play and more difficult to win or to play well because the rules are no longer so simple, but surely this does not show that such rules are not within the realm of the educationally possible for ordinary players. However, let us suppose forthe sake of argument that Trianosky is correct and ordinary players are unable not merely to master, but simply to learn these more complex rules. We might even grant that here, with respect to learnability, we have a positive rather than a negative analogy between morality and chess or golf. Could a moral code which violates this requirement be such that (a) it maximizes utility and (b) we might want to choose it?
With respect to (b) I think it can be said that ordinary moral "players" would not choose acode which was, forthem, educationally impossible. The "we" Trianosky has in mind can only refer to those extraordinary "players" whose intellectual capacities are such that they alone can learn the more complex provisions of the code. Necessarily, they will be in the minority. But then it becomes very hard to see how such a code could maximize utility, especially on an IRU approach where the rules of the code are assessed as functions of the utility of their general acceptance. the emended principle P (henceforth P'). We might, he suggests, have conclusive reasons in favour of picking a particular moral code "in spite of psychological ... difficulties inherent in obtaining its widespread acceptance, and perhaps in spite of the disutility incurred by the weakening or destruction of the motivations and inhibitions involved in accepting certain of its provisions".
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Note however that P' rules out only those moral codes which are psychologically impossible, not those psychologically difficult, for actual moral agents to accept. A successful slope argument will only be decisive when a proposed code is psychologically impossible, not when it is psychologically difficult. Doing what is right may not be easy but it must at least be possible.
It is this which directs our attention to the crucial and vulnerable feature of slope arguments-to the empirical claims being made. A slope argument will only be decisive with respect to P' and our choice of a moral code if it is successful. This success hinges upon the establishment of these empirical claims. Most slope arguments (such as those cited in the introduction to this paper) do not extend any empirical support for the psychological claims on which they depend. They simply assert the "inevitability" of the slide down the slope once a "first step" is taken by, say, qualifying a provision of our present moral code. A well-developed slope argument, however, might maintain that such a qualification would seriously affect the probabilities of moral agents acting as the code requires, then appeal to data from relevant studies as support for these claims. If the latter sort of argument were successful, and the empirical data convincing, then its decisiveness with respect to our choice of a moral code would be a welcome, not an unacceptable, consequence of P'.
What bothers Trianosky, though, is not that some slope arguments will (if successful) be decisive but that any successful slope argument will be decisive. The psychological-possibility requirement is too restrictive. It rules out certain codes which might maximize utility if accepted, and which actual moral agents might want to choose despite the fact that they run afoul of this requirement. He offers two examples:
... it might maximize utility to pick a code some of whose action-guiding provisions or rules were psychologically impossible for the average person to accept: those recommending (but not requiring) desirable but supererogatory, superhuman acts of sacrifice or perseverance, for instance. Even if such recommendations were widely disregarded, the frequency of the recommended behavior might nonetheless be higher than if there were no provision at all in the code. Or utility might be maximized by a code acceptance of some of whose provisions weakened other motivations and inhibitions, if the degree to which they did so was small, or if the weakened motivations were of relatively minor importance (motivations to do favors or minor acts of courtesy, for instance).
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I do not see, though, that these constitute genuine counterexamples. They are codes which might indeed maximize utility, and which actual moral agents might want to choose, but are they psychologically impossible? I think not. The first code would be if the supererogatory acts were required rather than recommended, i.e., if they were obligations rather than permissions. But in this case utility would not be maximized. It would be relatively easy to provide a successful and convincing slope argument against the psychological possibility of such a code. However, so long as the acts of supererogation are not required, and actual moral agents would not be doing what is wrong if they failed to perform them, I do not see that a code providing for them would be psychologically impossible. Once again, we might find this code more difficult to accept than one which does not aim to increase the frequency of desirable behaviour through the inclusion of a supererogation provision. But the requirement is designed only to insure that it is possible for actual moral agents to do what is right according to P'. This may not be easy and we may have to struggle with ourselves to obey the code.
Similar considerations apply to the second example. Acceptance of a code, some of whose provisions slightly weakened the motivations and inhibitions supporting other provisions (or weakened the motivations supporting minor provisions which, like the performance of favours or acts of courtesy, are recommended rather than required), might maximize utility and we might want to choose it. But such codes can be regarded as psychologically impossible only upon the assumption of a further argument that the motivational weakening is sufficient to result in the widespread disregard of, or failure to act on, the various provisions of the respective moral codes. To assume such an argument would be to deny that these codes might maximize utility, yet without it we do not have a violation of the psychological-possibility requirement. Agents may find these codes more difficult to accept because, due to the inclusion of certain provisions, they realize they will have to try especially hard to obey the other provisions whose motivational support will be weakened. But owing to the limited nature of the motivational deterioration, the codes will still be such that their acceptance is psychologically possible. The deterioration will not be sufficient to affect seriously the probabilities of their acting as the code requires.
4.
The reason Trianosky finds the psychological-possibility requirement too restrictive is that he construes it too broadly. He takes it to require that the code "be such that its acceptance would not generate motivational and attitudinal conflicts such that the acceptance of one portion of it (K) reduces or excludes the psychological-possibility of acceptance of other portions of it (L)". 20 In my response to his two examples, I
interpreted the requirement as covering only cases of exclusion (E), not of reduction (R). I would like now to defend this interpretation. The purpose of introducing the requirement was to emend P in order to sensitize it to slippery-slope considerations. As Trianosky notes, "the payoff of slope arguments, after all, comes in the claim that, because motivations are adversely affected by the psychological tensions generated by certain combinations of rules, the result will be widespread disregard or failure to act on various provisions of the moral law". 21 It is, then, a crucial feature of slope claims that the psychological stresses generated by certain combinations of provisions in a code be such that they will seriously affect the probabilities of agents acting as the code requires. The motivational deterioration predicted will, the argument runs, display itself in the agents' behaviour, having a significant impact on the probability of their doing what is-according to the code-right. Thus, moral agents will find themselves frustrated by a code which specifies that they ought to do what they cannot do. Now P' is clearly sensitized to these slope claims 22 when the psychological-possibility requirement is read as covering cases of (E). To see this, suppose that we do have a successful and convincing slope argument against code C. C will be such that its acceptance is not psychologically possible because the acceptance of provision K will exclude the psychological possibility of acceptance of provision L. In other words, the argument will have shown that the probabilities of agents acting as C requires will be seriously affected by the motivational deterioration generated by the inclusion of both provisions.
But to read the requirement as covering cases of (R), which somehow fall short of being cases of (E), is to attempt to sensitive P' to something more-or other-than slippery-slope claims. What would it mean to say that acceptance of K reduced, but did not exclude, the psychological possibility of acceptance of L? Presumably it would mean that despite their acceptance of K moral agents would still find it possible, though more difficult, to accept L. These agents could still maintain that minimal degree of motivation with respect to P, such that their motivations exerted significant and frequently decisive influence on the outcome of their deliberations about what to do, although they might have to work harder to maintain it. But this is not yet a slope argument. It lacks the "pay-off" or "real force" of slope arguments which comes "precisely in the claim that motivations will be so substantially weakened that in a great number of cases they will no longer exert a significant or decisive influence on action at all" . 23 As it stands, it is merely an argument on the 21 Ibid., 419. 22 It may well be that the addition of such a requirement has done more to P than simply to sensitize it to slippery-slope claims. It may, that is, introduce non-utilitarian factors much as Brandt's modification of IRU does (cf. Brandt, "Toward a Credible Form of Utilitarianism"). 23 Trianosky, "Rule-Utilitarianism", 421.
weakening of motivations, not a slope argument predicting a progressive motivational deterioration which will seriously affect the probabilities of agents acting in accordance with some code. The former sort of argument stops short of claiming that the psychological stress caused by a certain combination of provisions within a given code will likely (or inevitably) affect the agents' behaviour-the claim which singles out a slope argument.
Trianosky regards his treatment of utilitarian code-acceptance as illustrative of the broader issues under discussion. Those issues have to do with that family of views, both utilitarian and deontological, which he calls code-acceptance theories of Tightness: "theories, that is, which take an action to be right just in case it conforms to a code whose acceptance would bring it about that some morally desirable state of affairs obtained to the greatest extent possible". 24 The project of these theories to provide such a criterion of Tightness founders, as he sees it, on their insensitivity to the slippery slope, an insensitivity which can be remedied only by replacing the notion of acceptance-that is, by abandoning the project. I have argued that his cure is too extreme, that slippery-slope insensitivity can be remedied by, in effect, sensitizing the notion of acceptance to actual moral agents. However problematic, the project still seems promising.
